It happened one night

For seven years the US maintained that Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. However, a new US national intelligence estimate (NIE), released on December 3, 2007, has concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.

The assessment that the programme remains frozen represents the consensus view of 16 US intelligence agencies. This finding of the US intelligence community is consistent with that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Iranian foreign ministry has welcomed the US report.

The finding, however, challenges the views of President Bush and vice-president Dick Cheney who warned in October this year that if Iran continued on the present course the international community would impose serious strictures.

The French foreign minister talked about the inevitability of war if Iran did not stop its uranium enrichment and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Security Council, with unanimous support of five permanent members, imposed two rounds of sanctions on Iran on the ground that Iran was defying the international community’s demand to halt its uranium enrichment programme.

In 2005, the NIE of US assessed with high confidence that Iran was very keen to develop nuclear weapons. However, there was a caveat that Iran was not unmovable in this respect. The NIE also assessed that Iran was unlikely to reach weapon capability before early or the middle of the next decade.

In 2007, the NIE concludes with high confidence that Iran halted its nuclear programme in the fall of 2003. It says that the programme was not restarted and that Iran would be able to accumulate enough enriched uranium for a possible weapon between 2010-15.

It is possible that there is a gap between the occurrence of an event and information agencies collecting information about it and assessing it. It is obvious that during 2005 intelligence on the Iranian decision to halt its weapon acquisition effort had not reached Washington and that intelligence became available only in the current year. When the report of the director-general of IAEA was considered in the board of governors in September 2005 the agency could not certify that there were no clandestine activities or equipment in Iran. At that stage it was clear that Iranians had not come clear and told IAEA about their transactions with A Q Khan of Pakistan.

Iran decided to halt the weapon acquisition effort in the fall of 2003. On October 4, 2003, US and British intelligence services boarded the ship BBC China and seized centrifuge equipment which was on its way to Libya from Dubai where Khan’s nuclear Walmart was headquartered. The Iranian nuclear weapon effort was based on collaboration with Khan. Iran’s centrifuges — the two models P-1 and P-2 — originated from Khan’s laboratory.

Therefore, one wonders whether the boarding of the ship BBC China, winding up of Khan’s Dubai-based operations and halting of Iran’s weapons effort are related developments.

In February 2004, Khan publicly confessed on Pakistan TV about his proliferation activity. With the capture of the cargo of BBC China, Libya publicly gave up all nuclear ambitions and cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency and MI-6.

All this happened soon after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. This flurry of developments within a short period perhaps goes to explain why Iran halted its nuclear weapons effort in the fall of 2003.

It is obvious that Iranian cooperation with IAEA was less than optimal and continues to be so. The director-general in his statement on the NIE has said that it tallies with IAEA’s consistent statements over the last few years.

Although Iran still needs to clarify some important aspects of its past and present nuclear activities, the agency has no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons programme or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran. Iranians have clarified many of the issues raised by IAEA since the discovery of the clandestine centrifuge programme and improved their credibility vis-a-vis the IAEA.

Perhaps, if IAEA and US had been allowed direct access to Khan the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme could have been clear at an earlier stage.

However, there is no denying that Iran had a clandestine nuclear weapons programme supported by Khan and kept IAEA out of the picture. Therefore, India’s votes in the IAEA in 2005-06 were fully justified.

Fortunately, a realistic intelligence assessment on Iranian nuclear programme has emerged and the kind of motivated misassessment as was seen in the case of Iraqi WMD programme has been averted. Given the kind of political pressure being exerted by the US president, vice-president, the administration and legislative leaders on the Iranian nuclear issue, NIE assessors have displayed enormous courage in coming out with their finding.

The credibility of the US intelligence process has taken a beating in recent times. Their assessments on Iraq’s and Iran’s nuclear programmes were off the mark.

Recent books such as Shopping for Bombs by Gordon Corera and Deception by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark have brought to light US’s acceptance of Pakistan’s China-supported nuclear programme.